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Dufferin R. Harper* Provincial Entitlement to Gas Trunk
Line Ownership - Enforceability and
Constitutionality
The author discusses the interpretation of section 40 of the Nova Scotia
Accord Act (Canada) and the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia).
The section provides that the Government of Nova Scotia be given "a
reasonable opportunity" to acquire on a "commercial basis" up to a fifty
percent ownership in the Nova Scotia trunkine in certain circumstances. He
points out that even though the dispute between the Federal and Provincial
governments regarding the ownership of the offshore appears to be on hold,
the issue is relevant to the application of section 40.
L'auteur discute de l'interpr6tation de I'article 40 de la Loi de mise en oeuvre
de I'Accord Canada - Nouvelle-cosse sur les hydrocarbures extrac6tiers.
L'article prevoit que dans certaines circonstances, le gouvemement de
la Nouvelle-Ecosse doit avoir , la juste possibiit6 d'acqu~rir, sur une
base commerciale... au moins cinquante pour cent de la propri6t6 de la
canalisation n6o-6cossaise ,. L'auteur souligne que m~me si le diff6rend qui
oppose les gouvernements f6d6ral et provincial quant a la propri6t6 de la
zone extrac6ti~re semble 6tre suspendu, la question est pertinente pour ce
qui est de I'application de I'article 40.
* Partner, Merrick Holm, Halifax. The research assistance of summer student Jared Schwartz is
gratefully acknowledged.
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Introduction
The rules surrounding the development of the Nova Scotia offshore are
set out in both the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources
Accord Implementation Act' and the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petro-
leum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act.2 Collectively
these two Acts will be referred to as the Accord Acts. The Accord Acts are
essentially mirror pieces of legislation, contemporaneously enacted by the
Federal Government and the Province of Nova Scotia. One of the more
novel sections of the Accord Acts is section 40. It refers to a Nova Scotia
"trunkline" and confirms that the Province is to be provided with a reason-
able opportunity to acquire, on a commercial basis, up to a fifty per cent
ownership interest in the trunkline.
This paper will address the interpretation of section 40 including the
meaning of the terms "reasonable opportunity," "trunkline," and "com-
mercial basis." The paper will also address the jurisdictional basis for the
section and discuss the possibility that part of the section is unconstitution-
al and therefore unenforceable. This is significant if the province wishes
to acquire an ownership interest in a trunkline over the opposition of the
trunkline proponent.
1. S.C. 1988, c. 28 [Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada)].
2. S.N.S. 1987, c. 3 [Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia)].
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I. Background
More than 130 years after Confederation, jurisdiction over the offshore of
Nova Scotia remains unresolved. Both the Province of Nova Scotia and
the Government of Canada continue to assert jurisdiction. Although there
have been decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal on the offshore areas of Newfoundland
and British Columbia,3 there has not yet been any decision relating to the
Nova Scotia offshore. During the 1980s, as an alternative to a lengthy and
protracted court battle, and to facilitate the development of offshore oil
and gas resources, both levels of government entered into negotiations
concerning governance of the offshore.
In 1982, the Federal Government and the Province of Nova Scotia
executed the Canada-Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas
Resource Management and Revenue Sharing4 (1982 Accord). The 1982
Accord was subsequently implemented by Nova Scotia in 1984 through
the Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Agreement (Nova Scotia) Act5 and
by Canada in 1984 through the Canada-Nova Scotia Oil and Gas Agree-
ment Act.6 These were followed in 1986 by the Canada-Nova Scotia Off-
shore Petroleum Resources Accord7 (1986 Accord). The 1986 Accord was
subsequently implemented by the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia)
and the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada).8 The Accord Acts now serve as
a comprehensive regulatory regime governing oil and gas exploration in
the Nova Scotia offshore.
II. Section 40 of the Accord Acts
Section 40 is a unique provision. There is no comparable provision in
the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act9 or the
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation
3. Reference re: Mineral and Other Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf (1983), 145 D.L.R.
(3d) 9, 41 Nfld. & PEIR. 271 (Nfld.C.A.); Reference re: Seabed and Sub-soil of the Continental
Shelf offshore Newfoundland, [ 1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 (QL); Reference re: Ownership of Offshore Mineral
Rights (British Columbia), [ 1967] S.C.R. 792.
4. The Agreement was executed on March 2, 1982, between Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of
Canada and John Buchanan, Premier of Nova Scotia.
5. S.N.S. 1984, c. 2 [1984 Nova Scotia Act].
6. S.C. 1984, c. 29 [1984 Federal Act].
7. This Agreement was executed on August 26, 1986 between Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of
Canada, Marcel Masse, Federal Minister of Energy Mines and Resources, John Buchanan, Premier of
Nova Scotia, and Joel Matheson, Provincial Minister of Mines and Energy.
8. Supra notes I and 2.
9. S.C. 1987, c. 3.
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Newfoundland and Labrador Act.10 The author is also unaware of any
similar provisions in any other legislation affecting the other provinces of
Canada including British Columbia.
The precursor to the present section 40 was section 20 of the 1982 Ac-
cord, which stated:
Transportation
20. Without prejudice to decisions on the most appropriate mode for
transporting oil and gas from the offshore region:
(a) The parties agree that an application for a certificate for any new
natural gas or oil trunkline bringing gas or oil from the offshore region
into Nova Scotia, and including any extensions of the trunkline within
the province shall provide an option for the Nova Scotia government to
participate, on a commercial basis, in an interest of up to 50%. "
This clause was briefly considered in a memorandum of understanding
signed in 1982 between Nova Scotia Resources Limited (the Provincial
Government's representative at the time) and TransCanada Pipelines Lim-
ited. The memorandum stated:
Pursuant to the Canada/Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas
Resource Management and Revenue Sharing, the province has the option
to participate in any new natural gas or oil trunkline from the offshore
region into Nova Scotia including any extensions of the trunkline within
the Province, up to a 50% interest therein;... 12
Other than the brief reference above, there are no reported cases dealing
with the interpretation of section 20 of the 1982 Accord. It is interesting
to contrast the wording of the 1984 Nova Scotia Act with the wording of
section 20 of the 1982 Accord which it implements. Section 19(2) of the
1984 Nova Scotia Act states:
Right to Acquire Interest in Pipeline
10. R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-2.
11. Supra note 4, s. 20.
12. TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) (1999), 180 N.S.R. (2d) 355,557
A.PR. 355, 39 C.P.C. (4th) 390 at p. 11.
Provincial Entitlement to Gas Trunk Line Ownership - 413
Enforceability and Constitutionality
(2) Notwithstanding any other Act, an issuing authority shall not issue a
certificate or authorization in respect of a Nova Scotia offshore pipeline,
unless the issuing authority is satisfied that the Government of Nova Sco-
tia has been given a reasonable opportunity to acquire at least a fifty per
cent ownership interest in the pipeline. 3
It is noteworthy thai the heading to the section 19(2) refers to a "right."
Secondly, the term "option" used in the 1982 Accord has been replaced
with "reasonable opportunity."
The corresponding section of the 1984 Federal Act is section 22(2),
which falls under the heading of "Supply." It reads as follows:
(2) Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, an issuing authority
shall not issue a certificate or authorization in respect of a Nova Scotia
offshore pipeline, unless the issuing authority is satisfied that the Govern-
ment of Nova Scotia has been given a reasonable opportunity to acquire
at least a fifty per cent ownership interest in the pipeline.'
4
In the 1984 Federal Act, however, there is no reference to a "right" in the
heading.
Section 22 of the 1984 Federal Act was incorporated by reference into
the 1986 Accord and subsequently reproduced as section 40 in the Nova
Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia) and the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Cana-
da). Section 40 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia) states:
Interpretation
40 (1) In this Section,
(a) "certificate" means a certificate of public convenience and necessity
issued pursuant to Part III of the National Energy Board Act;
(b) "Nova Scotia trunkline" means a trunkline for the transmission of
petroleum in the offshore area or from the offshore area, and includes all
tanks, reservoirs, storage facilities, pumps, racks, compressors, loading
facilities, interstation systems of communication by telephone, telegraph
or radio, and real and personal property connected therewith that are lo-
cated within the offshore area or any other part of Nova Scotia, but does
not include laterals, gathering lines, flow lines, structures, and facilities
for the production and processing of petroleum.
13. Supra note 5 [emphasis added].
14. Supra note 6 [emphasis added].
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Option to acquire up to fifty per cent
(2) No certificate shall be issued in respect of a Nova Scotia trunkline,
unless the National Energy Board is satisfied that the Government of
Nova Scotia has been given a reasonable opportunity to acquire on a
commercial basis at least a fifty per cent, or such lesser percentage as the
Government proposes to acquire as a result of the opportunity, ownership
interest in the trunkline.
No authorization unless opportunity to acquire
(3) Where a certificate is not required in respect of a Nova Scotia trunkline,
no authorization shall be issued pursuant to clause (b) of subsection (1) of
Section 135 in respect of that trunkline, unless the Board is satisfied that
the Government of Nova Scotia has been given a reasonable opportunity
to acquire on a commercial basis at least a fifty per cent, or such lesser
percentage as the Government proposes to acquire as a result of the op-
portunity, ownership interest in the trunkline.
Minister may enter into agreements
(4) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter
into such agreements, make such arrangements and expend such money
as is necessary for him to participate in the construction, operation and
acquisition of trunklines including the acquisition of the ownership inter-
est referred to in this Section.'
5
Similarly, section 40 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada) states:
Nova Scotia trunkline
40. (1) In this section, "Nova Scotia trunkline" means a trunkline for the
transmission of petroleum in the offshore area or from the offshore area to
and within the Province, and includes all tanks, reservoirs, storage facili-
ties, pumps, racks, compressors, loading facilities, interstation systems of
communication by telephone, telegraph or radio, and real and personal
property connected therewith that are located within the Province or the
offshore area, but does not include laterals, gathering lines, flow lines,
structures, or facilities for the production and processing of petroleum.
15. Supra note 2 [emphasis added].
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Certificate
(2) No certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be issued
pursuant to Part III of the National Energy Board Act in respect of a Nova
Scotia trunkline, unless the National Energy Board is satisfied that the
Government of Nova Scotia has been given a reasonable opportunity to
acquire on a commercial basis at least fifty per cent, or such lesser per-
centage as the Government proposes to acquire as a result of the opportu-
nity, ownership interest in the trunkline.
Authorization
(3) Where a certificate referred to in subsection (2) is not required in re-
spect of a Nova Scotia trunkline, no authorization shall be issued under
paragraph 142(l)(b) in respect of that trunkline, unless the Board is sat-
isfied that the Government of Nova Scotia has been given a reasonable
opportunity to acquire on a commercial basis at least fifty per cent, or such
lesser percentage as the Government proposes to acquire as a result of the
opportunity, ownership interest in the trunkline.'
6
While no definition of the term "reasonable opportunity" has been pro-
vided in either of the Accord Acts, the meaning has not yet been an issue.
Perhaps this is because Nova Scotia has always declined to acquire an
ownership interest in trunklines.
17
The position of the Province may be changing. In the Hansard debates
for Wednesday, November 14, 2001, during questions involving the po-
tential Deep Panuke project (which was then being proposed by PanCana-
dian, now EnCana, and which included the potential for a trunkline), the
following exchange occurred:
MR. MANNING MACDONALD: Mr. Speaker, my question is to the
Premier. (Interruptions) As per Section 40 of the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, Nova Scotia
has the right to acquire a commercial interest of 50 per cent or less in any
offshore transmission line. My question to the Premier is, is the Premier
aware of any letter by his Minister responsible for the Petroleum Direc-
torate or the CEO of the Petroleum Directorate that signifies an intent to
exercise this option with regard to PanCanadian's transmission line, and
if so, will he table that letter?
16. Supra note I [emphasis added].
17. The most recent project where the province declined was the Sable Offshore Project. During that
project the government of Nova Scotia issued a letter stating that it would not be acquiring an interest
under section 40 (personal communication with Michael McPhee, Legal Counsel to CNSOPB).
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The Premier: Mr. Speaker, I am not aware whether or not there was a let-
ter. What I do know is it is the intention of the government to pursue and
receive value for the back-in provision for the offshore pipe.8
The above exchange highlights a difficult question in interpreting section
40, namely, what does the section confer on the province absent the term
"right," or conversely, what exactly must a trunkline proponent do to en-
sure that the province is given a "reasonable opportunity."
III. Interpretation of Section 40
Sections 40(2) and (3) of the Accord Acts refer to "trunkline," "reasonable
opportunity," and "commercial basis," none of which is fully defined. A
closer review of the specific terms reveals the following.
1. Trunkline
The term "trunkline" is partially defined in the Nova Scotia Accord Act
(Nova Scotia) within the definition of "Nova Scotia trunkline." 19 It means
a trunkline for the transmission of petroleum in the offshore or from the
offshore. It does not include laterals, gathering lines, flow lines and pro-
duction and processing facilities. However, the definition does not provide
adequate guidance as to what a trunkline really is. For example, what dis-
tinguishes a trunkline from a lateral? Is it based on pipeline size or some
other characteristic?
The Commission of the European Communities recently reviewed a
proposed merger of Saipem S.p.A and Bouygues Offshore S.A. In so do-
ing, it made the following statements regarding trunklines:
The industry normally distinguishes between two different types of pipe-
lines: (i) large pipelines with a diameter of 16 inches and above (so-called
"trunklines") and (ii) short pipelines, with diameter of less than 16 inches
("flowlines"). A trunkline represents a major transportation system as a
trunkline is a long pipeline linking main offshore oil and gas fields to the
shore and it serves as an interconnection within and between offshore
fields under the sea. A flowline represents a minor transportation system
between wells and offshore platforms. Third parties have generally sup-
18. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Debates (14 November 2001) at 7057.
19. Supra note 1, s. 40(l).
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ported the view of the parties that subsea pipelaying should be divided
into trunklines and flowlines respectively.
20
An interpretation of the term "trunkline" in the Accord Acts as referring
solely to a major transmission line (rather than a pipeline of any size) is
supported by the change in wording from the 1982 Accord, to the 1984
Federal Act and 1984 Nova Scotia Act, to the present day Accord Acts.
In the 1982 Accord, the term "trunkline" was used. In both of the 1984
Acts, the Legislature and Parliament used the term "pipeline." However,
in the Accord Acts, the Legislature and Parliament reverted to the term
"trunkline." In Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, the author refers
to the statutory presumption that different words mean different things.
He states:
The Presumption of Consistent Expression
Governing principle. It is presumed that the legislature uses language
carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative
instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words
have different meanings. Another way of understanding this presumption
is to say that the legislature is presumed to avoid stylistic variation. Once
a particular way of expressing a meaning has been adopted, it is used each
time that meaning is intended. Given this practice, it then makes sense to
infer that where a different form of expression is used, a different meaning
is intended.2"
Using the interpretation espoused in the Saipem decision, a Nova Scotia
trunkline would be the main petroleum transmission line running from the
offshore, provided it was greater than sixteen inches in diameter. Such an
interpretation certainly leaves open the possibility that smaller lines would
not be considered trunklines and therefore not trigger any of the provisions
of section 40.
2. Commercial Basis
The term "commercial basis" is used in many pieces of Canadian legisla-
20. EC, Commission Decision of 02/11 of 02/07/2002 declaring a concentration to be compatible
with the common market (Case No IV/M.2842 - SAIPEM / BOUYGUES OFFSHORE) according to
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, [2002] O.J.L. 168/20.
21. R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at
163.
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tion.22 It has generally been used to describe activities undertaken for a
profit. The term is also often associated with the phrase "based on sound
business practices." Thus, to fulfill the requirements of section 40, a
trunkline proponent arguably would have to place an opportunity before
the government that was both pursuant to sound business practice and
reasonable.
3. Reasonable Opportunity
The term "reasonable opportunity" is clearly the most problematic term
of section 40. It must be remembered that the government was originally
provided with an "option" in the 1982 Accord. The term "option" was re-
placed with the term "reasonable opportunity." In Mitsui & Co. (Canada)
v. Royal Bank, 3 the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with contractual op-
tions in the context of a lease agreement with an option to purchase. Major
J. writing for a unanimous court stated:
The meaning of an option to purchase was considered in Canadian Long
Island Petroleums Ltd. v. Irving Wire Products, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 715, per
Martland J. at pp. 731-732:
An option gives to the optionee, at the time it is granted, a
right, which he may exercise in the future, to compel the op-
tionor to convey to him the optioned property ....
In other words, the essence of an option to purchase is that,
forthwith upon the granting of the option, the optionee upon
the occurrence of certain events solely within his control can
compel a conveyance of the property to him.
In that case, it was held that the agreement in question created a right of
pre-emption and not an option to purchase. The difference between an
option and a right of pre-emption is that an option gives the optionee the
unilateral right to exercise the option and thereby require the optionor to
sell the subject-matter of the option upon pre-arranged terms. A right of
pre-emption, or right of first refusal, does not give the grantee the unilat-
eral power to compel the grantor to sell the property in question. Instead,
22. Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-7, Sched. V, Article 13(a)(iii);
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c.9, s.2 and 319; Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.E-15, s.68.26;
Telesat Canada Reorganization and Divestiture Act, S.C. 1991, c.52, s. 9(1); Conflicts of Interest Act,
R.S.A. 2000, c.C-23, s.31.
23. [199512S.C.R. 187,142 N.S.R.(2d) 1,407A.P.R. 1, (1995) 32C.B.R.(3d) 1, 123 D.L.R. (4th)
449,180 N.R. 161.
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the grantor has the sole power to decide whether to make an offer. It is
only at that point that the grantee (or lessee) is given the opportunity of
purchasing the property. A right of first refusal is a commitment by the
grantor to give the grantee the first chance to purchase should the grantor
decide to sell.24
The italicized portions of the quotation show that Justice Major's judg-
ment supports the position that an opportunity is less than an option. Major
J. added the following statements regarding options:
Paul M. Perell, in "Options, Rights of Prepurchase and Rights of First
Refusal as Contracts and as Interests in Land" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev.
1, at p. 37 lists the three principal features of an option, all of which are
present in clause 32:
1. exclusivity and irrevocability of the offer to sell within the time period
specified in the option;
2. specification of how the contract of sale may be created by the option
holder; and
3. obligation of the parties to enter into a contract of sale if the option is
exercised.
An option contract is an antecedent contract because it precedes the con-
tract of purchase and sale that will result if the opportunity provided by
the option is "seized upon" or exercised. Once an option is exercised, the
parties discharge their obligations under the option contract by entering
into the contract of purchase and sale. The exercise of an option is the
election to buy property on the terms specified in the option agreement,
and is the equivalent of accepting the irrevocable offer made in the option.
One cannot exercise the same option twice. The exercise of the option
must mean the acceptance of the offer. That acceptance must be uncondi-
tional, must only be made once, and must be made in accordance with the
terms of the option.25
Section 40 of the Accord Acts does not satisfy the above three factors
cited by Justice Major. Other than the reference to a commercial basis,
there is no limitation on time, no specifics surrounding how the contract
24. Ibid. at 10 [emphasis added].
25. Ibid. at 11 [emphasis added]. See also Sail Labrador Ltd. v. Navimar Corp. [1999] 1 S.C.R.
265.
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is to be created, and no specifics on how the government is to respond to
an offer. By consciously replacing the term "option" with "reasonable op-
portunity," the Legislature and Parliament obviously intended the benefit
accruing to the Nova Scotia government to be something other than, and
less than, an option.
The term "reasonable opportunity" arises quite frequently in Canadian
legislation. 6 The term has received little judicial attention. In Northwest
Territories (Commissioner) v. Simpson Air (1981) Ltd,27 Vertes J. discussed
the interpretation of the term "reasonable opportunity" in the context of a
trustee inspecting property pursuant to section 79 of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act. Vertes J. states:
What is meant by "reasonable opportunity" is not explained. In my opin-
ion this concept is similar to that of "reasonable time" to be given to a
debtor to satisfy a demand for payment. The question of what is "reason-
able" must be looked at in the light of all of the facts and circumstances
in the individual case: per Estey J. in Ronald Elwyn Lister Ltd. v. Dunlop
Canada Ltd. (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).2"
In Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, the author explains the pre-
sumption for interpreting statutes according to their ordinary meaning. In
so doing he cites the case of Camden (Marquis) v. C.I.R. as follows:
It is the duty of the court to construe a statute according to the ordinary
meaning of the words used, necessarily referring to dictionaries or other
literature for the sake of informing itself as to the ordinary meaning of any
words, but any evidence on the question is wholly inadmissible... [W]e
are not dealing with any private statutes nor with contracts. It is a public
Act of Parliament, and the Court must take judicial cognizance of the
language used without evidence.29
In the context of its ordinary meaning, The Concise Oxford Dictionary
defines opportunity as "favourable occasion, good chance."3°
26. Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.A-1, s.35(2); Aeronautics Act R.S.C. 1985, c.A-2,
s.4.79(2), s.5.5(1) and s.6(I); Bank Act S.C. 1991 c.46, s.129, s.277, s.278 and s.400; Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3, s.14.02(1), and s.79; Canada Business Corporations Act
R.S.C.1985, c.C-44, s.78(1); Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act R.S.C. 1985, c.C-3,
s.39.1(1); Agricultural Marshland Conservation Act S.N.S. 2000, c.22, s.30; Sale of Goods Act
R.S.N.S. 1989, c.408, s. 18 and s.36.
27. [1995] N.W.T.R. 184 (S.C.), (1994) 27 C.B.R. (3d) 190 at 203.
28. Ibid. at para. 26. See also Dale v. Hatfield Chase Corporation, [1922] 2 K.B. 282.
29. Supra note 21 at 14.
30. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
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The concept of an opportunity being related to a "chance" is reflected
in Cinabar Enterprises v. Bertelsen. In that case Wilkinson J., in discussing
an opportunity available to the plaintiff, makes the following statement:
The 1993 tank opportunity was an inchoate prospect that would not be
fully realized until the Schedule "B" tanks could be successfully marketed
to third parties. As the subject of a bargain, an "opportunity" is an ephem-
eral concept that cannot be analysed in terms of transferrable proprietary
rights. 31
Similarly, the "reasonable opportunity" afforded the government under
section 40 is not a transferable property right. The government has an op-
portunity or "chance" to accept a proposal to acquire an ownership interest
based on the terms as set out in the Act. Assuming the opportunity is on
a commercial basis, the government's only response can be acceptance
or rejection. If the government declines to participate, it will lose the op-
portunity.
IV. Jurisdiction and Constitutionality
The jurisdictional dispute over the offshore was not resolved by the enact-
ment of the two Accord Acts. Rather the dispute between the Federal and
Provincial Governments was effectively placed on hold. The lack of final-
ity associated with the jurisdictional dispute is reinforced by section 3 of
each of the Accord Acts. Section 3 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova
Scotia) states:
The provisions of this Act shall not be construed as providing a basis for
any claim by or on behalf of the Government of Canada in respect of any
entitlement to or legislative jurisdiction over the offshore area or any liv-
ing or non-living resources in the offshore area.
Similarly, section 3 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Canada) states:
For greater certainty, the provisions of this Act shall not be interpreted as
providing a basis for any claim by or on behalf of any province in respect
of any interest in or legislative jurisdiction over any offshore area or any
living or non-living resources of any offshore area.
31. (2000), 8 W.W.R. 561, 193 Sask. R. 161, [2000] S.J. No. 337 at 19.
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Without ending the jurisdictional argument, the Accord Acts have enabled
both levels of governments to transfer their authority over the offshore
(however extensive that may be) to the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Board (CNSOPB). The Accord Acts no longer focus on the
question of ownership but instead provide for joint management of the
resources. 32
Nova Scotia's claim to the offshore is predicated in part upon the Con-
stitution Act, 1867. Section 7 of that Act states: "The Provinces of Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick shall have the same Limits as at the passing of
this Act." Additionally section 109 states:
All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Prov-
inces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at the Union, and all
Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties,
shall belong to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia,
and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any
Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the
Pr6vince in the same.
Since Nova Scotia retained its territorial boundaries and proprietary right
over lands, mines, minerals and royalties at the time of Confederation, the
exact limits of those boundaries at that time must be examined. The terms
of the grant in 1621 by James I to Sir William Alexander support Nova
Scotia's contention that its boundaries include all or part of the offshore.
It states:
[A]I1 and singular the lands upon the continent and the Islands situate,
lying and being in America, within the head or promontory, commonly
called Cape Sable in the latitude of forty-three degrees nearly or there-
abouts, from that promontory along the shore, stretching to the west to the
bay commonly called Saint Mary's bay, thence to the north, by a direct
line crossing the entrance or mouth of the great bay, which extends east-
ward, between the countries of the Suroquois and Etchemins, so common-
ly called, to the river commonly called by the name of the Holy Cross or
the St. Croix, and to the furthest source or spring upon the western branch
of the same, which first mingles its waters with those of the said river,
thence by an imaginary direct line, to be drawn or run through the country,
or over the land to the north, to the first bay, river or spring emptying itself
32. Angus Taylor & Jim Dickey, "Regulatory Regime Canada-Newfoundland/Nova Scotia Offshore
Petroleum Board Issues" (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 51.
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into the great river of Canada, and from thence running to the east along
the shores of the said river of Canada to the river, bay, or harbour com-
monly called and known by the name of Gachepe, or Gaspee, and from
thence South East to the Islands called Baccalaos or Cape Breton, leaving
the same Islands upon the right, and the gulph of the said river or bay of
Canada and Newfoundland with the Islands thereunto belonging upon the
left, and from thence to the head or promontory of Cape Breton afore-
said, lying near the latitude of forty five degrees or thereabouts, and from
the said promontory of Cape Breton to the southward and westward to
Cape Sable aforesaid the place of beginning, including and comprehend-
ing within the said coasts and shores of the Sea, and the circumferences
thereof from Sea to Sea, all the lands upon the continent with the rivers,
torrents, bays, shores, Islands or Seas, lying near to, or within six leagues
from any part thereof on the western, northern or eastern parts of the said
coasts and precincts of the same, and to the southeast where Cape Breton
lies, and to the southward thereof where Cape Sable lies, all the Seas and
Islands to the south within forty leagues of the said shores, including the
great island commonly called the Isle of Sable or Sablon, lying south-
southeast in the Ocean about thirty leagues from Cape Breton aforesaid,
and being in the latitude of fourty four degrees or thereabouts. All which
land aforesaid, shall as all times hearafter be called and known by the
name of Nova Scotia or New Scotland in America... And if any questions,
or doubts shall hereafter arise upon the interpretation or construction of
any clause in the present Letters Patent contained, they shall all be taken
and interpreted in the most extensive sense, and in favor of the said Sir
William Alexander, his heirs and assigns aforesaid. Moreover we of our
certain knowledge, our own proper motion, regal authority, and royal
power have made, united, annexed, erected, created and incorporated:
and we do by these our Letters Patent, make, unite, annex, erect, create,
and incorporate, the whole and entire Province, and lands of Nova Scotia
aforesaid with all the limits thereof, Seas, etc.. Offices and Jurisdictions,
and all other things generally and specially above mentioned, into one
entire and free dominion and barony, to be called at all times hereafter by
the aforesaid name of Nova Scotia.33
Further support of Nova Scotia's claim to the offshore is found within
various treaties signed between 1632 and 1818, including the Treaty of St.
Germain-en-Laye in 1632, Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Treaty of Paris in
1763, and the 1818 Convention between United States and His Britiannic
Majesty, all of which incorporate references to territorial seas.34
33. 6 International Adjudications 136-37 (J. Moore ed., modem ser. 1923) cited in Edward C. Foley,
"Nova Scotia's Case for Coastal and Offshore Resources" (1981) 13 Ottawa L. Rev. 281 at 284 [Foley]
[emphasis added].
34. Foley, ibid. at 287.
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In the past, governors of Nova Scotia were given commissions upon
their appointment which described the boundaries of the territories they
were to govern. All of the commissions are essentially identical except that
from 1773 onward the island of St. John, now known as Prince Edward
Island, was removed since it had been granted separate colonial status. The
1846 commission of Lord Elgin describes the boundaries as follows:
Our said province of Nova Scotia in America, the said Province being
bounded on the westward by a line drawn from Cape Sable across the en-
trance to the centre of the Bay of Fundy; on the northward by a line drawn
along the centre of the said Bay to the mouth of the Musquat River by
the said river to its source, and from thence by a due East line across the
Isthmus into the Bay of Verte and the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Cape or
Promontory called Cape Breton in the Island of that name, including the
said Island, and also including all Islands within six leagues of the Coast,
and on the Southward by the Atlantic Ocean from the said Cape to Cape
Sable aforesaid, including the Island of that name, and all other islands
within forty leagues of the Coast, with all the rights, members, and ap-
purtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging.
35
The final line above-"all the rights, members and appurtenances what-
soever thereunto belonging"-appears in all of the commissions. In The
Ship "North" v. The King,36 the Supreme Court of Canada described the
territorial sea as an appurtenance, as has the International Court of Justice
in United Kingdom v. Norway (Fisheries Case).37 Lassa Oppenheim de-
scribed the use of the word appurtenance as follows: "it is a universally
recognized rule of the Law of Nations that the subsoil to an unbounded
depth belongs to the State which owns the territory on the surface and the
territorial waters appurtenant to the territory of the State. ' 38 Finally, refer-
ence is made to LaForest J.'s writings regarding Nova Scotia's ownership
of its three-mile territorial sea. In a 1959 article, he concluded that the
province owns all the territorial waters for three marine miles as "mea-
sured from the shore or a line drawn across the headlands of bays.''3
9
35. Quoted in Memorandum to F.H. Peters, Surveyer General, Topographical Survey of Canada,
Dept. of the Interior, from the Deputy General of N.S., 10 Sept. 1934, cited in Foley, ibid. at 289 [em-
phasis added].
36. (1906), 37 S.C.R. 385 at 401.
37. [1951]1.C.J.Rep. 116at 128.
38. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, ed., by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 8th ed. (Lon-
don: Longman, 1955) vol. 2 at 462, cited in Foley, supra note 25 at 290-91.
39. G6rard LaForest, Report on the Rights of the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and
Prince Edward Island to the Ownership of Adjacent Submarine Resources (1959) at A, cited in Foley,
supra note 32 at 300.
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V. Jurisdictional validity of Section 40(2)
Section 40(2) prohibits the National Energy Board (NEB) from issuing a
certificate of public convenience and necessity unless the NEB is satisfied
that the province was provided with a reasonable opportunity to acquire an
ownership interest in a trunkline.
Part III of the National Energy Board Act4° outlines the requirements
for construction and operation of pipelines. Section 30 of the NEB Act
confirms that no company shall operate a pipeline unless there is a certifi-
cate in force with respect to that pipeline. Pipelines are defined in section
2 as follows:
"Pipeline" means a line that is used or to be used for the transmission of
oil, gas or any other commodity and that connects a province with any
other province or provinces or extends beyond the limits of a province or
the offshore area as defined in section 123, and includes all branches, ex-
tensions, tanks, reservoirs, storage facilities, pumps, racks, compressors,
loading facilities, interstation systems of communication by telephone,
telegraph or radio and real and personal property and works connected
therewith, but does not include a sewer or water pipeline that is used or
proposed to be used solely for municipal purposes.
As a result, the NEB has jurisdiction only over pipelines that cross juris-
dictional lines. Pipelines that are wholly situate within the Province of
Nova Scotia would not trigger the authority of the NEB under the NEB
Act. Rather, those pipelines would only be subject to the provincial Pipe-
line Act.41
Section 2(2) of the Pipeline Act confirms that it applies to all pipelines
on or under Nova Scotia lands. Nova Scotia lands are defined as:
"Nova Scotia lands" means the landmass of Nova Scotia including Sable
Island, and includes the seabed and subsoil off the shore of the landmass
of Nova Scotia, the seabed and subsoil of the Continental shelf and slope
and the seabed and subsoil seaward from the Continental shelf and slope
to the limit of exploitability.
On the assumption that all or a portion of the offshore would be found
within the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia, any trunklines from the offshore
to the onshore would not involve inter-jurisdictional transfer of product.
40. R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7 [NEBAct].
41. R.S.N.S. 1989 c. 345.
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Consequently the NEB would have no authority to issue a certificate pur-
suant to Part III of the NEB Act, section 40(2) of the Accord Acts would
not be triggered, and a hearing before the NEB would not be required. This
could actually lead to a more streamlined regulatory process, since fewer
regulatory players would be involved in the approval process, something
long desired by the oil and gas industry.
For the Province to insist that section 40(2) be triggered, it would have
to take the position that the NEB had jurisdiction. In essence that would
entail the Province arguing that the offshore is not part of Nova Scotia, a
position it would be loathe to take.
If section 40(2) was found not to apply, or where a certificate was
waived pursuant to the provisions of the NEB Act,4 2 section 40(3) would
still apply. It deals with the situation where a certificate from the NEB is
not required. In those circumstances the CNSOPB has jurisdiction over
the granting of a provincial authorization. This sets up another potential
jurisdictional dispute between the CNSOPB pursuant to the Accord Acts
and the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board pursuant to the Pipeline
Act. As stated earlier, the Pipeline Act encompasses an area that includes
the offshore.
This potential dispute seems to have been resolved in favour of the
CNSOPB. Section 4 of the Nova Scotia Accord Act (Nova Scotia) states:
4. In case of any inconsistency or conflict between
(a) this Act or a regulation made pursuant thereto; and
(b) any other Provincial enactment,
this Act and the regulations made pursuant thereto prevail.43
Although a proponent may be able to extricate itself from the requirements
of section 40(2) and any attendant NEB hearing process, it will continue to
be subject to the provisions of section 40(3) and the difficulties associated
with its interpretation.
Summary
The first part of this paper outlines specific areas of concern in interpreting
section 40. It also provides a framework for trunkline proponents to assist
them in their interaction with the government. The argument put forth is
42. Section 58 of the NEB Act provides for exemptions from sections 29-33 of the NEB Act, includ-
ing the necessity of a certificate if a pipeline is less than 40km in length.
43. Supra note 2.
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that proponents must provide the government with the chance to acquire
an ownership interest in a trunkline, which the government must either
accept or reject. Notwithstanding that the government might be interested
in acquiring an ownership interest, if it refuses to partake in the particular
chance that is presented to it, the government does not have the "right" to
negotiate a better deal.
The second part of the paper discusses the jurisdictional issue sur-
rounding the Nova Scotia offshore. Although the dispute between the
Federal and Provincial governments appears to be on hold, the issue of
jurisdiction has some applicability to section 40. More particularly, it may
impact on section 40(2) and oust the role of the NEB in the offshore.

